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From the editor
In this edition of the Banking and finance disputes review, there are a number 
of articles which highlight the risks and benefits of different jurisdictions as 
centres for dispute resolution by banks and financial institutions.
Many countries now compete to offer an efficient and reliable service for the 
resolution of complex financial disputes.
In The Financial List: resolving financial markets disputes in London, we 
examine a new court that is specifically aimed at attracting complex financial 
litigation of importance. England is already the first choice for much litigation 
important to the international financial markets – the new financial list shows 
that it aims to maintain its reputation in the face of increasing competition. One 
new source of competition is shown by The Singapore International Commercial 
Court: a challenge to arbitration? This initiative in Singapore may attract banks 
that would otherwise have chosen arbitration or litigation elsewhere, especially 
for disputes centred in Asia.
Against the backdrop of increasing competition for complex financial disputes, 
banks are keen to avoid exposure to less developed or uncertain legal systems. 
Flexible jurisdiction clauses enable banks to take advantage of these beneficial 
jurisdictions in the right circumstances. France and the unilateral jurisdiction 
clause highlights one potential local law risk that affects this choice – a much 
publicised problem that has been given new impetus by another decision of the 
French Cour de cassation. Derivatives mis-selling claims by public authorities in 
Italy discusses a different local law risk in another European jurisdiction and 
demonstrates the sort of jurisdictional battles that arise. Local law overriding 
the ISDA Master Agreement is dealt with in our case note on SwissMarine 
Corporation Ltd v OW Supply & Trading A/S [2015] EWHC 1571 (Comm). Finally, 
Local law risk: overriding mandatory provisions and Article 9 of the Rome I 
Regulation takes an overarching look at how local law considerations can affect 
international contracts irrespective of their governing law.
Two new legislative developments are explored in Insolvency update: the recast 
Insolvency Regulation, which summarises the key issues for banks arising from 
this major forthcoming European regulation, and Damages for late payment of 
insurance claims, which follows up a particular point adverted to in an article 
in the May 2015 edition: The Insurance Act 2015: a banking case study. Our 
two other case notes are on Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch), addressing a point of construction of the ISDA 
Master Agreement, and on Titan Europe 2006-3 plc v Colliers International UK 
plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1083, confirming that a securitisation issuer can recover 
damages for a negligent property valuation.
David Lee
Partner
Tel +44 20 7444 3181
david.lee@nortonrosefulbright.com
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The Financial List:  
resolving financial markets  
disputes in London
The Financial List should present an opportunity  
for London to build on its reputation as a  
pre-eminent global centre for the resolution  
of large financial disputes. 
Litigation in England
Parties across the world regularly 
choose the English courts to resolve 
international disputes. English courts 
have a reputation for consistency, 
honesty, transparency and technical 
knowledge. English judges are seen as 
impartial and independent. There are 
no juries in civil cases, no awards of 
punitive or exemplary damages and 
there is a ‘loser pays’ system. Although 
costs and fees have risen in recent 
years, against this background they 
still compare favourably with other 
jurisdictions and with arbitration.
England is a global financial centre 
and it is natural that litigation relating 
to complex financial transactions 
should find its home in England. The 
High Court in London has been one of 
the principal locations for large-scale 
financial litigation for many years and 
data made available for the year to 
March 2015 shows a further increase 
in litigation in the Commercial Court 
where 63 per cent of litigants were 
foreign nationals.
However, this position is increasingly 
under threat. New York law is regularly 
selected in contracts and claimants 
often see the New York courts as offering 
them advantages. Specialist commercial 
courts have been established in a 
number of Middle Eastern and Asian 
jurisdictions, such as the courts of 
the Dubai International Financial 
Centre and the Singapore International 
Commercial Court (see The Singapore 
International Commercial Court: a 
challenge to arbitration?). Arbitration is 
also an alternative, with initiatives such 
as PRIME Finance aiming directly at 
complex financial disputes that might 
otherwise be heard in England.
The Financial List
In a speech in July 2015, the Lord 
Chief Justice announced the creation 
of a new Financial List for complex 
and important financial markets cases 
of high value or which raise market 
issues. This followed a speech the 
previous year announcing the initiative 
and a consultation during the first half 
of 2015. The Financial List is intended 
to improve dispute resolution for these 
cases and ensure that the English 
courts continue to meet the needs of 
the international financial community. 
The Financial List started operation on 
October 1, 2015.
Cases intended for the Financial List 
may be started in the Commercial Court 
or Chancery Division. Cases may be 
transferred into or out of the Financial 
List at the request of the parties or at 
the judge’s initiative. Once a case is 
in the List, it will be allocated at the 
first case management conference to 
a designated judge who will manage 
it through to trial and enforcement. 
The nominated Financial List judges 
will receive additional guidance on 
market developments; currently this set 
of judges consists of five Commercial 
Court judges and five Chancery 
judges together with the head of the 
Commercial Court and the Chancellor 
of the High Court.
A claim is suitable for the Financial 
List if it is for more than £50 million 
and relates to one of a specified list 
of financial categories or if it requires 
particular expertise in the financial 
markets or raises issues of general 
importance in the financial markets. 
Although there is no minimum amount 
for claims requiring expertise or of 
general importance, it is unclear 
how this will be applied in practice, 
particularly for claims that are well 
below the £50 million threshold. And 
even if a case is worth more than £50 
million and falls within the relevant 
categories, it is clear from guidance 
published with the new rules that it 
will not be suitable for the list if it is 
‘straightforward’.
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There will be a pilot Financial Markets 
Test Case Scheme to allow issues 
of general market importance to 
be resolved without waiting for an 
appropriate case to be litigated. Courts 
will be able to grant declaratory relief 
against, if possible, an agreed set of 
facts. The court must be satisfied it has 
heard full argument from all sides. In 
general, parties will bear their own costs.
Challenges and opportunities
The creation of the Financial List 
represents a significant opportunity for 
London to build on its reputation as a 
global centre for financial litigation. 
The concentration of cases into a select 
group of judges who have control 
of cases throughout their lifetime 
and benefit from additional market 
guidance will enhance the reputation 
of the English courts for technical 
excellence and industry and market 
awareness. The test case procedure 
could allow English courts to give 
definitive guidance on issues of market 
importance that influence practice 
around the world.
Proper implementation of the Financial 
List inevitably involves challenges as 
well as opportunities. The allocation to 
a single judge will allow continuity but 
in some ways is less flexible than the 
existing system. Financial List cases will 
often be difficult and complex with long-
running trials and ensuring availability 
of an allocated Financial List judge to 
deal with urgent applications in other 
cases may be problematical. These cases 
may also need to be dealt with on an 
expedited basis, since delays in fixing a 
trial date or in handing down judgment 
after trial might be particularly 
damaging. A concentration of expertise 
in a small group of Financial List judges 
might enhance the quality of justice, but 
there must be a special effort to ensure 
it does not introduce additional cost 
through delay.
Similarly, the test case procedure 
must be implemented with care. Any 
hypothetical scenario should be wide 
enough to apply generally yet clear 
enough to be determinative of issues 
that arise in future disputes – any 
ambiguity will simply enable disputing 
parties to argue that the result of 
the test case does not apply to them. 
Interested parties should be able to 
intervene. In some cases, this right will 
be clear: the intervention of ISDA in a 
case on the construction of the ISDA 
Master Agreement, for instance. But in 
others it may involve a delicate balance 
between ensuring all interested parties 
are heard and multiplying the cost and 
complexity of litigation.
For the Financial List to thrive, it should 
take advantage of the technological 
developments that are being planned 
for English courts. Online systems for 
case and document management are 
crucial for dealing with the large and 
complex litigation likely to be included 
in the Financial List.
Overall, the Financial List should be 
seen as an opportunity for the English 
courts to leverage their expertise 
and reputation for complex financial 
litigation.
For more information contact:
 
Chris Warren-Smith
Global head of investigations
Tel +44 20 7444 5992
chris.warren-smith@nortonrosefulbright.com
 
Adam Sanitt
Head of disputes knowledge
Tel +44 20 7444 2269
adam.sanitt@nortonrosefulbright.com
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The Singapore International 
Commercial Court: a challenge  
to arbitration?
The new Singapore International Commercial Court 
(SICC) was officially launched on January 5, 2015.  
The SICC is intended to be the Asian centre for resolving 
international commercial disputes, in particular, 
international banking and financial disputes.
Whilst Singapore has for some time 
enjoyed success as the leading 
regional centre for international 
arbitration, financial institutions 
have traditionally been resistant to 
arbitration, preferring litigation as their 
chosen method of dispute resolution. 
Accordingly, the SICC may be attractive 
to financial institutions as a new 
forum for international banking and 
financial disputes. Even though the 
SICC typically enjoys jurisdiction via 
a contractual jurisdiction clause, the 
Singapore High Court may on its own 
motion order a transfer of a case to the 
SICC where ‘it is more appropriate for 
the case to be heard in the Court’.
The Singapore High Court has seen 
several high profile international 
banking and financial disputes in 
recent years. These include suits 
brought by Filipino, Taiwanese and 
Chinese investors against different 
international banks and a suit 
brought by a Singapore public-listed 
infrastructure company against a 
Middle Eastern-based bank arising out 
of credit facilities for a construction 
project in Libya.
The number of cross-border disputes 
involving financial institutions is 
only set to increase as the Singapore 
government continues to actively 
promote Singapore as a major Asian 
financial centre. Singapore is home to 
over 700 financial institutions offering 
a myriad of products and services 
across various asset classes. This 
includes over 200 banks, a growing 
number of which have also chosen to 
base their operational headquarters 
in Singapore to service their regional 
group activities. Singapore is the third 
largest foreign exchange centre globally 
and the largest foreign exchange centre 
in Asia Pacific. Singapore is also ranked 
the largest over the counter (OTC) 
interest rate derivatives centre in Asia 
Pacific excluding Japan by turnover. 
Assets under management in Singapore 
rose by 30 per cent from S$1.8 trillion 
in 2013 to over S$2.3 trillion in 2014.
Given this trend, the Singapore High 
Court may face increasingly technical 
and complex international banking 
and financial disputes. Should such 
disputes be filed before the Singapore 
High Court in the future, it is plausible 
that the High Court may transfer the 
dispute to the SICC.
The SICC
The SICC has several advantages  
for international users over the 
domestic courts. For example, key 
distinguishing features of the SICC 
include a panel of international judges, 
the possibility of having foreign legal 
representation, the determination of 
foreign law on the basis of submissions 
rather than expert evidence, the 
exclusion of Singapore’s laws of 
evidence and the ability to limit or vary 
the right of appeal. These features are 
discussed in more detail below.
The judges of the SICC comprise  
both the local judiciary and a panel 
of international judges. The inaugural 
panel of eleven international judges 
contains both civilian and common  
law jurists from around the globe.  
They are:
Carolyn Berger, former judge of the 
Delaware Supreme Court and vice 
chancellor of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery (United States).
Patricia Bergin, chief judge of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales 
(Australia).
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Roger Giles QC, former judge of the 
Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales and judge of the 
Dubai International Financial Centre 
Courts (Australia).
Irmgard Griss, former president of the 
Austrian Supreme Court (Austria).
Dominique Hascher, judge of the 
French Supreme Court (France).
Dyson Heydon AC QC, former judge 
of the High Court of Australia and 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
(Australia).
Sir Vivian Ramsey, former judge of the 
High Court and judge in charge of the 
Technology and Construction Court 
(England and Wales).
Anselmo Reyes, former judge of the 
Court of First Instance in Hong Kong 
in charge of the construction and 
arbitration list and the commercial and 
admiralty list.
Sir Bernard Rix, former judge in charge 
of the Commercial Court and Lord 
Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal 
(England and Wales).
Yasuhei Taniguchi, former chairman 
of the Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Body and professor emeritus at Tokyo 
University (Japan).
Simon Thorley QC, IP law specialist 
and former deputy High Court judge 
and deputy chairman of the Copyright 
Tribunal (England and Wales).
Advantages of the SICC
Rules and practice directions have been 
specifically formulated for the SICC and 
will provide it with the framework to 
hear cross-border commercial disputes. 
Some of the salient features are:
Joinder of third parties
Unlike arbitration, the SICC has the 
power to join third parties to an action, 
even if the third parties are not parties 
to a written jurisdiction agreement 
and do not consent to being joined 
as a party. Arguably the SICC will not 
exercise this power if the third party 
will be in breach of an arbitration 
agreement. In any event, a State or the 
sovereign of a State may not be made a 
party to an action in the SICC (whether 
by joinder or otherwise) unless it has 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the SICC 
under a written jurisdiction agreement.
Banking and finance disputes review
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Foreign legal representation
Parties may be represented by foreign 
lawyers in cases which have no 
substantial connection to Singapore 
(known as ‘offshore cases’), as well as 
in cases where the subject matter or 
issues in dispute give rise to questions 
of foreign law.
Laws of evidence and foreign law
Parties may apply to exclude the 
application of Singapore’s laws of 
evidence. As with arbitration, the SICC 
may allow parties to choose to apply 
alternative rules of evidence, with 
which they may be more familiar. The 
SICC may, upon the application of a 
party, order that any question of foreign 
law be determined on the basis of 
submissions, without requiring formal 
proof by experts.
Confidentiality of proceedings
Proceedings will generally take place 
in open court, but parties will have the 
option to apply for the proceedings to 
be confidential. In deciding to make 
a confidentiality order, the SICC will 
take into account whether: (i) the case 
is an offshore case; and (ii) there is an 
agreement between the parties on the 
making of such an order.
Right of appeal
Decisions of the SICC may be appealed 
to the Singapore Court of Appeal, 
although parties will be allowed to 
contractually exclude or limit this 
right of appeal. If the parties agree in 
writing to waive, limit or vary the right 
to appeal against any judgment or 
order of the SICC, then an appeal may 
be brought only to the extent as agreed 
between the parties.
Enforcement
The Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Amendment) Act 2014 stipulates that 
parties who have agreed to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the SICC shall, unless 
expressly stated otherwise, also be 
considered to have agreed to submit 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
SICC, to carry out any SICC judgment 
without undue delay and to waive 
any recourse to any court or tribunal 
outside Singapore against any SICC 
judgment and the enforcement of such 
a judgment.
In contrast to international arbitral 
awards that are enforceable by way 
of the New York Convention on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, SICC judgments have the status 
of a Singapore High Court judgment. 
Their enforceability in a foreign 
jurisdiction would be dependent on the 
principles governing the recognition of 
foreign judgments in that jurisdiction. 
This is a possible disadvantage of an 
SICC judgment compared to an arbitral 
award. The current disparity between 
the enforceability of SICC judgments 
and arbitration awards may restrict 
the circumstances in which parties 
will prefer the SICC to situations 
where enforcement will take place 
in Singapore itself, or in a country 
where parties are relatively confident a 
Singapore judgment will be enforced.
Conclusion
The SICC’s combination of international 
expertise and commercially focussed 
rules should make it an attractive 
forum for resolving international 
banking and finance disputes. 
For multi-party disputes involving 
jurisdictions that allow enforcement 
of Singapore judgments, the SICC may 
be preferred to arbitration. And for 
complex financial disputes centred in 
Asia, the SICC may be more practical 
than litigation in London or New York.
For more information contact:
 
KC Lye
Partner
Tel +65 6309 5304
kc.lye@nortonrosefulbright.com
 
Darius Chan
Senior associate
Tel +65 6309 5301
darius.chan@nortonrosefulbright.com
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France and the unilateral 
jurisdiction clause
A unilateral jurisdiction clause, also known as an 
asymmetrical jurisdiction clause or a one-sided 
jurisdiction clause, provides that one party must sue 
the other party in the courts of a specified country 
while the other party remains free to sue the first one 
in the jurisdiction of its choice. These clauses are very 
common in financial agreements where they generally 
provide that the borrower can only sue the lenders in a 
specific country while the lenders can sue the borrower 
in that country or in any other country which has 
jurisdiction over the dispute.
A unilateral jurisdiction clause is 
therefore an advantage given to the 
lenders since they may only be sued by 
the borrowers in their home jurisdiction 
whereas they can start proceedings 
against the borrowers in any country 
which will accept jurisdiction. In 
particular, this enables the lenders 
to take action against the borrower 
wherever its assets are located, in order 
to facilitate enforcement.
French Supreme Court 
and unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses: part 1
On September 26, 2012, in its 
decision Mme X v Banque Privée 
Edmond de Rothschild, the Cour de 
cassation, the French Supreme Court, 
decided that unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses are invalid both under the 
French civil code and the Brussels I 
Regulation (Regulation No 44/2001, 
the ‘Regulation’: note that this has 
now been replaced by Regulation No 
1215/2012, the ‘recast Regulation’, 
but the reasoning in Rothschild should 
apply also to the recast Regulation). 
The Regulation is the principal source 
of law on jurisdiction for EU Member 
States. This decision was widely 
reported and criticised.
Rothschild concerned a jurisdiction 
clause in an investment management 
agreement between a Spanish client 
domiciled in France and a Luxembourg 
bank which gave the Luxembourg courts 
exclusive jurisdiction but which also 
gave the bank the right to bring actions 
against the client in the jurisdiction 
of the client and any other courts 
with jurisdiction. The French Cour de 
cassation held that the jurisdiction 
clause was null and void on the grounds 
that it was ‘potestative’ (see below) 
and contrary to the purpose of the then 
applicable provisions of the Regulation.
According to article 1170 of the French 
Civil Code:
‘A potestative condition is one which 
makes the execution of the agreement 
depend upon an event that one or the 
other of the contracting parties has the 
power to bring about or to prevent.’
Article 1174 of the same Code adds:
‘Any obligation is null when it has been 
contracted subject to a potestative 
condition on the part of the party who 
binds himself.’
There appear to be a number of 
problems with the reasoning of the 
Cour de cassation. First, these Articles 
apply to contractual obligations – such 
as performance, payment, transfer of 
ownership – but it appears doubtful 
that they apply to jurisdiction clauses. 
Furthermore, even if they do apply 
to jurisdiction clauses, the ‘party 
who binds himself’ is the party who 
is bound to take action only in a 
specific jurisdiction and accordingly 
the ‘potestative’ condition is not 
undertaken by him but by the other 
party to the contract.
Second, the Cour de cassation should 
have rendered its decision only under 
the Regulation and not under domestic 
French law. And it is difficult to see 
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why a unilateral jurisdiction clause 
should be seen as contradicting the 
purpose of the Regulation. On the 
contrary, the Court of Justice of the 
European Community held in 1986 
that jurisdiction clauses conferring a 
benefit on one party are valid (Anterist 
v Crédit Lyonnais (Case 22/85)).
There was some hope that this decision 
was motivated by its particular 
fact pattern: the claimant was an 
individual French person pursuing 
a claim against an international 
bank which actually had used its 
French affiliate to negotiate the 
contract but was now seeking to take 
advantage of a jurisdiction clause to 
restrain proceedings in France. Many 
commentators argued that the effect 
would be limited to such situations.
These hopes have been somewhat 
dashed by a new case decided by the 
Cour de cassation.
French Supreme Court 
and unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses: part 2
On March 15, 2015, the French 
Supreme Court held that a unilateral 
jurisdiction clause entered into 
between a French company and 
a Swiss bank was invalid under 
the Lugano Convention (which is 
substantially the same in relevant 
respects to the Regulation and the 
recast Regulation).
Unlike Rothschild, the 2015 case 
involves a more traditional set of 
financing arrangements between 
a French corporate borrower and 
Crédit Suisse, with an on-demand 
guarantee issued by Société Générale. 
The credit agreements contained a 
market-standard jurisdiction clause 
giving exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Zurich courts but providing that 
Crédit Suisse could bring actions 
against the borrower before any other 
competent court. Crédit Suisse raised 
a jurisdictional objection to an action 
brought against it by the borrower in 
the French courts, on the basis of the 
unilateral jurisdiction clause, which 
Crédit Suisse argued was consistent 
with the provisions of the Lugano 
Convention. This objection was 
sustained by the lower court but, on 
appeal, the Cour de cassation reversed 
the result.
The Cour de cassation held that the 
lower court reached its conclusion 
without considering whether the 
imbalance criticised by the borrower 
– namely, that the clause granted the 
bank the right to bring proceedings 
before ‘any other competent tribunal’ 
but did not specify the objective basis 
on which this alternative jurisdiction 
was founded – was contrary to the 
objectives of foreseeability and legal 
certainty underpinning the Lugano 
Convention. Interestingly, the Cour 
de cassation (probably well aware of 
the criticism of its earlier decision) 
made no mention of the ‘potestative’ 
principle in its decision, despite the 
argument having been made by the 
appellant. Instead it focused on: 
(i) the absence of objective criteria 
setting out the basis for any alternative 
jurisdiction, and (ii) the fact that 
the unbalanced nature of unilateral 
jurisdiction clauses was, in its view, 
contrary to the aims of the Lugano 
Convention. Therefore, the Cour de 
cassation overturned the decision of 
the Court of Appeal.
Once again, the reasoning of the Cour 
de cassation, even if based only on the 
article 23 of the Lugano Convention 
without reference to French law 
and particularly to the ‘potestative’ 
condition, is difficult to understand. 
On the face of it, unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses do not appear to be contrary to 
the object and purpose of the Lugano 
Convention (or the Regulation). In fact, 
the decision of the Cour de cassation 
seems to result from philosophical 
and sociological rather than purely 
legal considerations. It considered that 
the weaker party must be protected 
and therefore a clause which gave an 
advantage to a bank – which is seen by 
the Cour de cassation as the stronger 
party – must be rendered null and 
void.
French Supreme Court 
and unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses: part 3
On October 7, 2015, the Cour de 
cassation rendered yet another 
decision on unilateral jurisdiction 
clauses, holding this time that a 
particular unilateral jurisdiction clause 
was not contrary to the Regulation.
In this case, Apple Sales Ltd (‘Apple’), 
an Irish company in the Apple 
Computers group, signed an agreement 
with a French reseller containing the 
following clause:
‘This Agreement and the corresponding 
relationship between the parties 
shall be governed by and construed 
in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic of Ireland and the parties shall 
submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the Republic of Ireland. Apple reserves 
the right to institute proceedings against 
Reseller in the courts having jurisdiction 
in the place where Reseller has its seat 
or in any jurisdiction where harm to 
Apple is occurring.’
When the reseller brought an action 
against Apple alleging anticompetitive 
practices before the French commercial 
court, Apple argued that this was in 
violation of the jurisdiction clause 
and requested that the French court 
decline jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, 
the reseller made the argument that 
the clause was ‘potestative’ and that it 
should be disregarded, meaning that 
under ordinary jurisdiction principles, 
the reseller was entitled to bring an 
action in France, where the harm to the 
reseller occurred.
France and the unilateral jurisdiction clause 
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The Cour de Cassation held that the 
jurisdiction clause permitted the 
identification of jurisdictions before 
which an action could be brought 
with respect to the performance of 
the contract, and therefore complied 
with the requirement of predictability 
with which jurisdiction clauses must 
comply. The Court made no mention 
whatsoever of the ‘potestative’ nature 
of the clause.
This is a favourable development 
which suggests that these clauses 
may be upheld in France if drafted 
appropriately. However, the jurisdiction 
clause was more limited than the usual 
‘you can sue me only before my home 
court but I can sue you wherever I find 
a court that will accept jurisdiction’ 
type clause often found in international 
contracts. Apple’s right to sue the 
reseller was limited to the courts of 
the reseller’s corporate seat (in this 
case France) or ‘any jurisdiction where 
harm to Apple is occurring’. This 
limitation may be what enabled the 
Cour de Cassation to determine that the 
clause ‘permitted the identification of 
jurisdictions before which an action 
could be brought with respect to the 
performance of the contract’ and so 
was sufficiently predictable.
Conclusion
Financial institutions can mitigate 
the legal risk by using a clause that 
specifically sets out all the jurisdictions 
in which they have the right to sue 
the other party. This avoids the 
criticism of uncertainty which was the 
main argument used by the Cour de 
cassation. Another alternative, if it is 
commercially practicable, is to use a 
hybrid arbitration clause rather than 
a unilateral jurisdiction clause – these 
clauses have previously been upheld by 
the Cour de cassation.
The recast Regulation did not take the 
opportunity to remove this uncertainty 
– if anything, it has increased it. One 
change in the recast Regulation is that 
a jurisdiction clause must meet not 
only the formal requirements of the 
Regulation but also that it must be 
valid under the law of the Member State 
whose courts have been designated by 
the parties. Therefore, applying this 
new rule, a court undertakes a multi-
stage process. First, it must determine 
whether the jurisdiction clause is valid 
under the recast Regulation. Then it 
must determine what law governs the 
jurisdiction clause. And then, having 
decided the governing law, it must 
then decide whether the clause is valid 
according to that governing law. This 
new approach may increase the risk of 
nullity of a unilateral jurisdiction clause.
Clearly, prudence must now be the 
order of the day in France as far as 
unilateral jurisdiction clauses are 
concerned. Any party to a contract with 
a connection to France must be aware 
of the fragility of such clauses. Such a 
connection would include any party to 
the contract being domiciled in France 
or any obligations under the contract 
being performed in France.
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Following the financial crisis of 2008, Italian public 
authorities filed thousands of legal actions against 
banks and financial institutions seeking redress for 
the negative consequences they suffered as a result of 
entering into complex derivatives transactions.
In this article, we examine the course 
of this litigation and discuss the 
ramifications for the interpretation 
of the ISDA Master Agreement and 
the risks undertaken by banks and 
financial institutions in dealing with 
Italian counterparties and facing 
litigation in Italy.
Use of derivatives by the 
Italian public sector
The Italian Ministry of Economy  
and Finance has estimated that, at 
the end of 2014, 216 Italian public 
authorities had entered into 433  
over the counter (OTC) derivatives 
contracts with a notional value of 
approximately €24.8 billion (61 per 
cent with foreign counterparties and 
the remaining 39 per cent with Italian 
banks). The Italian regions were the 
most active, accounting for about 
€15 billion (60 per cent of the total), 
followed by 30 municipalities with  
€6 billion (24 per cent), 32 provinces 
with €2.4 billion (10 per cent) and  
137 smaller cities with €1.5 billion  
(6 per cent).
Their use of derivatives had been  
more extensive in the past (reaching 
its peak in 2007 with 1,333 contracts 
involving 798 public entities), 
decreasing only in the last few 
years, after the Italian Central Bank 
in 2008 banned public authorities 
from entering into swap contracts. 
Public authorities are now subject to 
strict limitations when entering into 
derivatives transactions. The damage, 
however, has already been done, as 
shown by the raft of legal proceedings 
in the recent past.
Claims by Italian  
public authorities
Derivatives mis-selling claims by Italian 
public authorities are based on both 
contractual and tortious liability. They 
have commonly included the following 
allegations:
• the public authority’s lack of 
capacity to enter into the swap
• the public authority’s lack of 
expertise in respect of financial 
instruments, notwithstanding that 
it signed a declaration that it was 
a sophisticated investor before 
executing the derivatives transaction
• the presence of costs associated 
with the transaction that were not 
disclosed by banks at the time the 
derivatives transaction was executed 
(so-called ‘implicit costs’)
• the violation of the principle of good 
faith and the breach of a number 
of provisions of Italian financial 
services regulation.
These claims may also include 
allegations of misconduct by financial 
institutions, such as that:
• the transaction was vitiated for 
reasons such as misrepresentation 
or fraud
• the ISDA Master Agreement was 
not signed by the bank (although 
duly performed by both sides) and/
or did not contain certain required 
information
• the bank failed to inform them of 
the ‘cooling off period’ under Italian 
law during which they could have 
cancelled the contracts
• the bank failed to comply with 
the duties of care, fairness and 
transparency and failed to operate 
so as to obtain the best possible 
result for the local authority from the 
investment service provided
Derivatives mis-selling claims  
by public authorities in Italy
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• the bank did not communicate the 
conflict of interest to which it was 
subject by being both arranger and 
swap dealer, nor did it obtain the 
public entity’s consent in writing to 
this conflict
• the transaction, represented by 
banks as being for the purpose of 
hedging, was actually speculative 
and consequently inappropriate for 
the public authority’s risk profile
• the bank did not clearly explain the 
nature of the derivative products 
and the related risks
• the banks failed to assess the public 
authority’s investment experience 
and appetite for risk or provide them 
with general information on the 
risks of financial investments.
Focus on jurisdiction
Jurisdiction has been a central, 
substantive issue arising in almost 
all the proceedings between Italian 
public authorities and banks. Public 
authorities have routinely tried to have 
derivatives disputes heard in Italy 
rather than in the UK, perhaps due to 
a perception of higher litigation costs 
in England or a belief that English 
courts would be more favourable 
to international banks than Italian 
municipalities. Conversely, banks  
have turned first to the English courts 
and, when sued in Italy, have argued 
that the ISDA Master Agreement  
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the 
English courts.
This has resulted in pre-emptive 
proceedings brought by public 
authorities before Italian courts, on 
the grounds that under the Brussels I 
Regulation (Regulation 44/2001, now 
replaced by Regulation 1215/2012), 
the first court to be chosen has the 
right to determine its jurisdiction, 
thereby staying any subsequent 
proceedings in a Member State until 
that determination is reached. Note 
that this tactic may not now be effective 
as under Article 31(2) of the Brussels 
I Regulation, since the beginning 
of 2015, the English courts would 
not be obliged to stay proceedings 
where exclusive jurisdiction has been 
conferred on them by the terms of the 
ISDA Master Agreement.
Italian interpretation of the 
ISDA Master Agreement 
jurisdiction clause
Following a number of contradictory 
Italian local court decisions, the Italian 
Supreme Court has recently ruled on 
jurisdiction and forum-shopping issues 
in two cases involving ISDA Master 
Agreements entered into by two Italian 
municipalities (Milan and Venice).
The municipalities claimed damages 
for tortious liability arising from 
conduct before the conclusion of the 
contract (i.e. in the pre-contractual 
phase). Then both municipalities 
filed a concurrent claim for damages 
for contractual liability for breach of 
collateral consultancy agreements. The 
defendants disputed the local courts’ 
jurisdiction on the basis of Article 13 
of the ISDA Master Agreement, which 
provided that English courts have 
jurisdiction for disputes ‘relating to  
this Agreement’.
The Supreme Court found that the 
Italian courts had jurisdiction in both 
cases. The first case, involving the 
Municipality of Milan, was decided by 
the Supreme Court on February 27, 
2012. The Supreme Court held that 
the jurisdiction clause did not extend 
to tort claims. First, it decided that in 
a complex dispute where subordinate 
claims are also filed, jurisdiction 
is determined by the main claim. 
Italian courts had jurisdiction over 
the main tort claim under the Brussels 
Regulation, subject to the effect of the 
jurisdiction clause in the ISDA Master 
Agreement.
The Supreme Court then set out 
principles of interpretation of this 
jurisdiction clause. It clarified, in 
line with European case law, that 
jurisdiction clauses must be strictly 
interpreted and assessed separately 
from the agreement in which they 
are contained and, most importantly, 
that the national judge, before which 
their interpretation is sought, decides 
such interpretation. Hence, based on 
Italian law principles of contractual 
interpretation, the Court held that the 
wording ‘relating to this Agreement’ in 
the jurisdiction clause under Article 13 
of the ISDA Master Agreement did not 
extend the jurisdiction of English courts 
to all disputes, whether contractual 
or tortious, connected to the same 
derivative contractual framework.
In conclusion, the Italian Supreme 
Court ruled that in the event of a 
jurisdiction clause as the one contained 
in the ISDA Master Agreement, 
referring to disputes ‘relating to this 
Agreement’, English jurisdiction does 
not extend also to tort claims.
Two years later, in a similar case 
involving the Municipality of Venice, 
the Italian Supreme Court reconfirmed 
the first ruling in full based on the 
same reasoning.
Administrative and  
criminal implications
Italian derivatives disputes may also 
involve administrative claims and 
criminal liability.
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For instance, in a derivatives dispute 
involving the city of Pisa, one issue 
was the validity of a public authority’s 
power to exercise self-redress on the 
grounds that the transaction did not 
meet the ‘economic convenience 
test’ laid down in Italian law. This 
enabled the public authority to make 
a unilateral decision to retroactively 
cancel the resolutions authorising the 
entry into the derivatives transaction. 
The Italian Supreme Administrative 
Court ruled in 2012 that Pisa’s exercise 
of self-redress was void as the existence 
of ‘implicit costs’ in a swap was not 
sufficient in itself to violate Italian 
law. Another potential violation is that 
the public authority has exceeded the 
statutory limitations on entering into 
derivatives contracts.
Recent cases have shown that Italian 
administrative courts generally accept 
jurisdiction over derivatives disputes 
involving public authorities whenever 
the exercise of administrative powers 
(or the procedure to select the swap 
counterparty) is disputed, irrespective 
of the fact that the parties agreed to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the English 
courts. Conversely, where the only issue 
is the validity of the derivatives contract, 
Italian administrative courts will 
generally accept that English courts have 
sole jurisdiction. Where the sole cause 
of action is administrative, the Brussels 
Regulation may not apply as it covers 
only ‘civil and commercial’ matters.
There have also been proceedings in 
Italy before the criminal courts, such 
as one widely publicised case before 
the Criminal Court of Milan against 
four international banks, some bank 
employees and former city officials. 
Banks and their representatives could 
face significant risks in criminal 
proceedings: for instance, seizure of 
assets, temporary bans from doing 
business with municipalities, and 
monetary fines. Criminal actions may 
also trigger administrative liabilities, 
which also apply to international 
corporations doing business in Italy.
Conclusions
There are significant differences 
between litigation in Italy and litigation 
in the UK. Legal proceedings in Italy 
can be extremely lengthy due to the 
Italian judicial system’s ‘three instance’ 
structure. Banks involved in legal 
actions pending before Italian courts 
have faced reputational damage, 
following some initial unfavourable 
judgments on derivatives transactions. 
In some cases, Italian courts 
have adopted a highly formalistic 
interpretation of Italian financial 
services regulations, which can be 
disadvantageous to banks. However, 
in other cases, banks have succeeded 
in jurisdiction challenges following 
years of litigation. Accordingly, the 
outcome of legal proceedings in 
Italy can be highly unpredictable. 
Finally, derivatives litigation in Italy 
often follows a two-track procedure, 
with claims filed in both civil and 
administrative courts. This leads to 
the risk of conflicting judgments from 
civil, administrative and even criminal 
courts in respect of the same matter.
The Italian courts have shown a 
propensity to accept jurisdiction in 
these cases. Administrative proceedings 
fall outside the jurisdictional 
limitations of the Brussels I Regulation. 
Even where the Brussels I Regulation 
does apply, the Italian Supreme 
Court’s restrictive interpretation of 
the ISDA Master Agreement exclusive 
jurisdiction clause has allowed it to 
take jurisdiction over tortious claims 
arising out of derivatives disputes, 
perhaps surprisingly from an 
international perspective.
In light of the above and considering 
the volume of trading in derivatives, 
its impact on Italian local finance 
and the uncertainty of case law on 
many substantial issues, derivatives 
litigation involving public authorities is 
a continuing source of risk and liability 
for financial institutions.
For more information contact:
 
Ilario Giangrossi
Partner
Tel +39 02 8635 9441
ilario.giangrossi@nortonrosefulbright.com
 
Chiara Bicci
Senior associate
Tel +39 02 8635 9443
chiara.bicci@nortonrosefulbright.com
Derivatives mis-selling claims by public authorities in Italy
Norton Rose Fulbright – November 2015 13
Local law risks are a concern for financial institutions 
that operate across different jurisdictions. They try to 
mitigate these risks by choosing a particular governing 
law for their contracts, such as English governing law, 
and granting exclusive jurisdiction to particular courts, 
such as the English courts. But there are circumstances 
where an English court, even considering an English 
law contract, will apply provisions of a foreign law that 
render a contract unenforceable. Issues arising from the 
recent temporary imposition of Greek capital controls 
show that the scope of this power contains many 
uncertainties and ambiguities.
Consider an example, which we shall 
develop throughout this article: a bank 
lends money to a special purpose 
vehicle set up as part of a project 
financing in Greece. The transaction 
documentation requires the special 
purpose vehicle to accumulate money 
in specific accounts in Greece and then 
to repay the lender from those accounts. 
The loan is denominated in euros. It is 
governed by English law and subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the English 
courts. The question for the bank is: 
what Greek law risks is it exposed 
to, notwithstanding those choices of 
English governing law and jurisdiction.
Rome Regulation: overriding 
mandatory provisions
English courts, together with all other 
courts within the European Union, 
determine the applicable law of a 
contract in accordance with the Rome I 
Regulation (Regulation No 593/2008, 
the ‘Regulation’). Article 9 of the 
Regulation provides as follows:
‘1. Overriding mandatory provisions 
are provisions the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such 
as its political, social or economic 
organisation, to such an extent that they 
are applicable to any situation falling 
within their scope, irrespective of the 
law otherwise applicable to the contract 
under this Regulation
 … 
3. Effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of 
the country where the obligations 
arising out of the contract have to be 
or have been performed, in so far as 
those overriding mandatory provisions 
render the performance of the contract 
unlawful. In considering whether to give 
effect to those provisions, regard shall be 
had to their nature and purpose and to 
the consequences of their application or 
non-application.’
This Article allows English courts (or 
the courts of another EU Member State) 
to apply a foreign law to a contract, 
irrespective of its governing law. 
However, it only applies to ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’. This is generally 
a small, easily identifiable class of laws 
and so the extra local law risk imposed 
by this Article is often seen as limited.
However, the temporary imposition 
of capital controls in Greece earlier 
this year provided an example of 
provisions that arguably fell within this 
definition. Financial institutions were 
suddenly faced with urgent questions 
of interpretation of Article 9. And it 
emerged that there were a number of 
hitherto unforeseen ambiguities and 
uncertainties within this Article. In 
particular:
• Whole or part
Did the test for a rule of law to 
count as an ‘overriding mandatory 
provision’ apply to a piece of 
legislation as a whole or to each 
individual rule within it?
• Location of obligations
What jurisdictions fell within 
the category of those where 
the obligations have to be 
performed and did there have to 
be any connection between the 
Local law risk: overriding  
mandatory provisions and  
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation
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performance of that obligation 
and the obligation which was to be 
rendered unlawful?
• Meaning of unlawful
What doctrines of local law applied 
to make a contract ‘unlawful’?
• Unlawful for whom?
Did the performance have to be 
unlawful for a party to the contract 
or another person?
• Effect on default provisions
Given the discretionary application 
of Article 9, what was the effect on 
illegality events of default?
We consider each of these issues below 
and highlight the resulting risks by 
reference to our continuing example.
Note that English law may also contain 
a separate rule that covers the same 
ground as Article 9(3), although it is of 
slightly wider scope, but which applies 
only to English law governed contracts 
(the rule stems from Ralli Brothers v 
Compania Naviera Sota Aznar [1920] 
2 KB 287). There is some doubt as to 
whether this rule still exists (although 
recent authority suggests that it does – 
see Eurobank Ergasias v Kalliroi [2015] 
EWHC 2377 (Comm)). In any case, 
we will concentrate in this article on 
Article 9, which is of pan-European 
relevance.
Whole or part
Suppose that performance of an 
obligation is contrary to a rule in a 
piece of legislation in the jurisdiction 
where it is to be performed. Article 
9 requires a determination whether 
that rule is an ‘overriding mandatory 
provision’, using the examples set out 
in Article 9(1). But does the test apply 
to the particular rule or the whole 
piece of legislation? The legislation as 
a whole may be significant enough to 
fall within the definition, whereas the 
particular rule – being only a minor 
part of it – may not, if considered in 
isolation.
Using the example of Greek capital 
controls, the legislation that brought 
it into effect arguably fell within the 
definition as ‘regarded as crucial  
by a country for safeguarding its  
public interests’, given the context of 
Greece’s financial and political crisis. 
However, a particular rule within it, 
such as, for instance, an obligation 
to provide information to a regulator, 
might not, in isolation, fall within  
this category.
Although there is no authority on 
this issue, a granular approach does 
not appear consonant with the aims 
of Article 9. If a particular sub-rule 
is of less significance, a court may 
deal with that by a non-exercise 
of its discretionary power. Applied 
to our example, it means that any 
contravention of capital controls 
legislation would be relevant, without 
having to undertake a further analysis 
of whether that part fell within the 
definition of ‘overriding mandatory 
provisions’.
Location of obligations
English courts have traditionally taken 
a strict view as to where payment 
obligations ‘have … to be performed’. 
The contract must effectively specify a 
place of performance for the obligation, 
so that it cannot be performed in any 
other country while complying with 
the contract (see Tamil Nadu Electricity 
Board v ST-CMS Electric Company 
[2007] EWHC 1713 (Comm)). As a 
payment obligation will generally 
only specify where the payment is to 
be made, rather than where it must 
originate, mandatory overriding 
obligations of the payor’s country will 
not be relevant. That is, if the payor is 
prevented from paying from an account 
in its own jurisdiction, the English 
courts will expect it to pay using some 
other means.
Our case study is a rare example of a 
payment obligation that is required 
to be performed in the payor’s 
jurisdiction. The contract specifies 
a particular transaction account 
in Greece which must be used to 
accumulate all the borrower’s income 
and which must be used as the source 
to repay its loan.
Article 9(3) does not link the place of 
performance with the obligation that 
is unlawful. The first half of the clause 
refers to ‘the obligations arising out of 
the contract’ but the second half refers 
to ‘the performance of the contract’. 
There is no link in the Article between 
obligations that have to be performed in 
a certain place and the obligations that 
are rendered unlawful. A connection 
between those obligations might be 
implied by the process of statutory 
interpretation, if the courts took the 
view that the purpose of the Article 
was to restrict unlawfulness only to 
obligations that had to be performed 
in the relevant jurisdiction. However, 
in the absence of any authority, it is 
uncertain whether this purposive 
interpretation would be adopted.
The implication of this for financial 
institutions is that they must 
enumerate all the jurisdictions where 
performance of any part of a contract 
is required and determine whether 
any overriding mandatory obligations 
affects any obligations of the contract. 
At least until this is clarified by the 
courts, this ambiguity adds extra due 
diligence overhead.
Meaning of unlawful
Article 9(3) refers to the contract being 
rendered ‘unlawful’. This is to be 
interpreted not in accordance with the 
law of any particular jurisdiction but in 
a supra-national sense. Accordingly, for 
each local jurisdiction, it is necessary 
to determine exactly which doctrines of 
local law correspond to unlawfulness 
within Article 9(3).
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It is easy to overlook this issue when 
restricted to an English law perspective. 
There is an English law doctrine of 
illegality and it appears to coincide 
with unlawfulness, as set out in Article 
9. However, other jurisdictions may 
have a less well-developed doctrine of 
illegality, or it may overlap with related 
doctrines.
Take our continuing case study: a 
payment is required to be made from 
a particular bank account; a law is 
passed which makes it illegal for the 
bank to effect this payment but does 
not directly address the position of 
the payor. Assume that, as a matter 
of statutory construction, it is not 
then illegal for the payor to make the 
payment, but it will be impossible for 
it to do so because it is illegal for the 
bank to transfer the funds. It is clear, as 
a matter of English law, that the payor’s 
obligation is not illegal, although it is 
impossible. Depending on the terms 
of the contract, similar consequences 
might follow – the contract may be 
terminated by frustration, for instance. 
But this is still distinct from the 
consequences of illegality.
Yet it is quite plausible that another 
legal system might treat this fact-
situation as an example of illegality, 
rather than some other doctrine. In that 
case, the question arises whether the 
local law definition of illegality prevails 
over any floating European concept. If 
it does, the scope of Article 9 might be 
substantially expanded.
Unlawful for whom?
A related ambiguity is that Article 9(3) 
states that performance of the contract 
must be unlawful, but it does not say 
by whom. Not only does Article 9 not 
make any explicit connection between 
the obligation that is to be performed 
and the obligation that is unlawful, but 
it does not link the person for whom 
performance is illegal with the parties 
to the contract.
In most cases, this will not cause a 
problem: it will clearly be a party to 
the contract who must perform the 
obligations under the contract and any 
illegality will be in respect of that party. 
But the case study illustrates a common 
situation where that is not the case. The 
contract states that a payment must be 
made from a bank account – although 
the bank is not a party to the contract, 
this is an action that only it can 
undertake. That is, the obligation on the 
party to the contract is to procure that 
the bank transfer funds from its account 
with the bank to another account.
It is not uncommon for a contract to 
contain such a provision: an obligation 
on a party to procure that something 
be done, or that a third party do 
something. At present, it is unclear 
whether Article 9 will be engaged when 
that act is illegal for the person who, as 
set out in the contract, is required to do 
it, if they are not a party to the contract.
Effect on default provisions
Many contracts contain an event of 
default or other termination provision 
that refers to illegality of the contract. 
They may either refer to illegality 
according to relevant local laws or 
illegality according to the governing 
law of the contract.
If the event of default extends to 
illegality according to the local law of 
any relevant jurisdiction, there has to 
be some limit to which jurisdictions 
are considered relevant. One option is 
to include all jurisdictions where an 
obligation under the contract is to be 
performed. As discussed above, this 
may itself be a complex question. It 
avoids all the subsequent questions 
about the operation of Article 9 
although, of course, this is at the cost 
of including a much wider range of 
illegality than Article 9, depending 
on how the various ambiguities noted 
above are resolved.
If a clause is restricted to illegality 
under the governing law of the 
contract, that effectively refers back 
to Article 9. That is, there will be 
illegality under the governing law of 
the contract if there is illegality under a 
relevant local law and Article 9 applies. 
Accordingly, the various ambiguities 
noted above are still relevant. But there 
is another problem. Article 9 renders 
a contract illegal on a discretionary 
basis – so even if all the preconditions 
are satisfied, it is not possible to say 
with certainty that a contract is illegal 
until a court has exercised its discretion 
accordingly. This makes it inherently 
risky to rely on a governing law 
illegality clause based on a local law 
illegality translated to the governing 
law by Article 9.
Conclusion
The ability of a court under Article 
9 to declare a contract illegal under 
its governing law based on non-
compliance with local law obligations 
adds to the local law risks faced by a 
bank in its cross-border transactions. 
The various ambiguities of Article 
9, many of which have only recently 
become apparent, increase the scope 
of this risk. Banks will meet this risk 
by careful drafting and further due 
diligence. However, this can only 
be of limited help where political or 
economic crises cause drastic changes 
to local laws in the future.
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The European Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EC) 
No. 1346/2000) (the ‘Regulation’) has reduced the 
risk to banks and financial institutions of enforcement 
against insolvent companies in EU Member States 
by enabling cross-border cooperation and increasing 
certainty in the law applicable on insolvency. New 
European legislation addresses some deficiencies of the 
Regulation and introduces a new framework for group 
insolvencies. Banks lending to groups of companies 
will take note in particular of the increased scope for 
coordination between different jurisdictions in complex 
cross-border group insolvencies.
The recast Regulation
The Regulation originally came into 
force on May 31, 2002. Its purpose was 
to provide rules to determine the proper 
jurisdiction for a debtor’s insolvency 
proceedings and the applicable law to 
be used in those proceedings and to 
require mandatory recognition of those 
proceedings in other EU member states. 
The Insolvency Regulation provided for 
a review of its operation after ten years 
and in December 2012 the European 
Commission made proposals for it 
to be updated. Following extensive 
trialogue discussions between the 
European Commission, European 
Parliament and Council, the final text 
of the recast Insolvency Regulation was 
approved by the European Parliament 
on May 20, 2015, and the recast 
Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EU) 
No. 2015/848) (the ‘recast Regulation’) 
entered into force on June 26, 2015, 
applying to insolvency proceedings 
from June 26, 2017.
Key changes
The recast Regulation contains 
a codification of the method of 
determination of centre of main 
interests (COMI). COMI is a central 
concept that determines whether the 
recast Regulation applies to a debtor 
and the jurisdiction for opening 
of main insolvency proceedings. 
COMI will be presumed to be at the 
registered office, but the presumption is 
rebuttable if the central administration 
is located in another Member State 
and a comprehensive assessment of 
all the relevant factors establishes, in 
a manner that is ascertainable by third 
parties, that the company’s actual 
centre of management and supervision 
and of the management of its interests 
is located in that other Member State. 
The registered office presumption will 
not apply if there has been a move 
of the registered office during the 
three months prior to the opening of 
proceedings. Although essentially 
stating what has been developed by 
case law since the Regulation, these 
new rules provide welcome clarity.
The recast Regulation is extended 
in scope to new categories of 
proceedings. It covers hybrid and pre-
insolvency proceedings and secondary 
proceedings will no longer be limited 
to liquidation proceedings where 
a company has an establishment. 
The definition of ‘establishment’ is 
amended to ‘any place of operations 
where the debtor carries out a non-
transitory economic activity with 
human means and assets’ (using a 
reference to ‘assets’ rather than ‘goods’) 
and the relevant time for assessing 
an establishment will be either the 
time of the opening of the secondary 
proceedings or, alternatively, the 
three month period prior to that, so 
that secondary proceedings may still 
be possible even if an establishment 
has recently closed. In addition, the 
insolvency practitioner in the main 
proceedings is now expressly permitted 
to provide undertakings to treat local 
creditors as they would be treated 
under secondary proceedings.
Insolvency update: the recast 
insolvency regulation
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Under the recast Regulation, the 
courts of the member state where main 
insolvency proceedings are opened will 
also have jurisdiction to hear actions 
derived directly from the insolvency 
proceedings that are closely linked, 
such as avoidance actions, to avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings.
There will be new linked registers of 
insolvency proceedings. The recast 
Regulation calls for both national 
electronically-searchable databases 
in each member state, and for these to 
then be linked via a central European 
e-justice portal. On July 7, 2014, the 
Commission announced a pilot scheme 
to connect insolvency registers in the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, 
Netherlands, Austria, Romania and 
Slovenia through the e-justice portal.
Group companies
The recast Regulation introduces 
a framework for group insolvency 
proceedings. The aim is to improve the 
efficiency of insolvency proceedings 
concerning different members of 
a group of companies, which may 
encourage cooperation across the 
group and rescue of the group as 
a whole. Currently, each insolvent 
debtor company is subject to separate 
insolvency proceedings in the place of 
its COMI. Where two or more members 
of a group of companies are subject to 
insolvency proceedings, an insolvency 
practitioner appointed to any group 
company, together with any courts 
involved, will be obliged to cooperate 
(for example by agreement or protocol) 
to facilitate the effective administration 
of those proceedings, to the extent it is 
not incompatible with the rules of such 
proceedings and there is no conflict of 
interest in doing so.
Group coordination proceedings 
may be requested before any court 
having jurisdiction over the insolvency 
proceedings of a group member by 
the insolvency practitioner appointed 
there. The purpose of these proceedings 
is to propose a group coordination plan 
recommending a comprehensive set of 
measures appropriate to an integrated 
approach to the resolution of the group 
members’ insolvencies. Insolvency 
practitioners in other members 
states may choose not to participate 
in proposed group coordination 
proceedings, so they will only be 
effective where they are consensual. 
It is already open to insolvency 
practitioners in some European 
jurisdictions to form agreements with 
insolvency practitioners in other 
jurisdictions and give appropriate 
undertakings to creditors in order to 
effect a form of group coordination 
plan, and given the new provisions 
in the recast Regulation, we may 
see increased group coordination 
in advance of the new provisions 
applying.
Timing of the recast 
Regulation
The recast Regulation has direct 
effect in each member state (apart 
from Denmark, which has opted-
out) without the need for separate 
enactment at a national level. The 
majority of the provisions apply 
from June 26, 2017 and the original 
Regulation will continue to apply 
to proceedings opened before this 
date. The establishment of national 
insolvency registers will not come into 
force until June 26, 2018, with the 
requirement for an EU interconnected 
register by June 26, 2019.
Conclusion
Banks and financial institutions will 
hope to take advantage of the recast 
Regulation. The amendments to 
COMI and extension to all secondary 
proceedings should discourage forum 
shopping. The insolvency register 
and group coordination proceedings 
will facilitate complex cross-border 
insolvencies. Even before the recast 
Regulation comes into effect, there 
may be a push towards increased 
cooperation in group insolvencies.
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In The Insurance Act 2015: a banking case study, 
published in the previous edition of the Banking 
and finance disputes review, we commented on the 
absence of a provision in the Insurance Act 2015 
entitling a bank insured to contractual remedies 
(including damages) in the event of late payment or 
an unreasonable refusal by insurers to pay insurance 
claims. While the government had omitted such a 
clause from the Act given the opposing views of a 
number of stakeholders, it promised to introduce such  
a clause in legislation once a solution had been agreed.
It has now done so. Part 5 of the 
Enterprise Bill (the Bill), introduced 
in the House of Lords on September 
16, 2015, provides for the insertion 
into the Act of clause 13A which 
largely mirrors the wording proposed 
by the Law Commissions of England 
and Wales and of Scotland (the 
Commissions). If this amendment to 
the Act is successful, it will come into 
force a year later – that will be some 
time after August 2016 (when the Act 
as originally passed comes into force).
As discussed in our previous article, 
claims by banks may involve complex 
issues of compliance, knowledge 
and disclosure, that lead to lengthy 
investigations by insurers. These are 
exactly the circumstances where this 
amendment should rebalance the 
position between insurers and bank 
insureds.
In this article, we first provide a brief 
overview of the current legal position 
in relation to the late payment of 
insurance proceeds and the reasoning 
behind reform in this area of insurance 
law, before providing a summary of 
clause 13A, addressing the likely areas 
of dispute that may arise out its current 
drafting.
The current position  
and reasons for reform
The normal position is that where one 
party suffers loss because the other 
party has failed to meet its contractual 
obligations, the innocent party may 
claim damages for the loss suffered 
(Hadley v Baxendale (1854) EWHC 
J70). The English courts have, however, 
held that insurance contracts fall 
outside this rule. In English law, an 
insurer is not liable for any loss caused 
by its delay or failure to pay a valid 
claim. This is based on the legal fiction 
that the insurer’s contractual obligation 
is to prevent the loss occurring (or to 
‘hold the insured harmless’) rather 
than to pay out a claim. As a result, 
claims payments are considered to be 
damages. Where payment is late, there 
can be no remedy (other than interest 
on the amount outstanding) as English 
law does not allow damages for late 
payment of damages (The President of 
India v Lips Maritime Corporation (The 
Lips) [1988] AC 395).
The operation of the ‘hold harmless’ 
principle is clearly illustrated in Sprung 
v Royal Insurance (UK) Limited [1999] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 111. In that case, the 
insured was unable to finance the 
repairs to his factory after his insurer 
denied liability for the damage caused 
during a break-in. As a result, after a 
few months, the insured was forced 
to wind up his business. He brought 
proceedings against his insurer and 
managed to recover the amount of 
his claim under the policy together 
with interest, but the court held that 
he could not recover a further loss 
representing the amount for which he 
could have sold his business had the 
delayed payment by the insurer been 
made in good time and the business 
been kept open.
The Commissions’ report on insurance 
law reform in July 2014 set out a 
number of reasons for changing the 
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unfairness illustrated by Sprung, 
including the following:
• The notion that an insurer’s primary 
obligation under a contract of 
indemnity is to prevent the insured 
loss from occurring does not reflect 
commercial reality. Insureds expect 
to have a contractual right to a 
payment in the event of a loss.
• The current position unfairly favours 
the interests of insurers and their 
failure to make a timely payment 
risks prejudicing the very purpose 
for which insurance is purchased.
• The English law position is 
inconsistent with that of a number 
of other jurisdictions, and less 
protective of insureds. This,  
among other things, poses risks 
to the competitiveness of the UK 
insurance market.
The Government believes that this 
change in the law will incentivise 
insurers to pay claims promptly 
and allow for damages to be paid to 
policyholders who have suffered loss 
as a result of late payment. However, 
the introduction of the Commissions’ 
proposal in the Bill has come as a 
surprise to the insurance industry 
which opposed the introduction of 
such a remedy as drafted in clause 13A. 
The industry was against the inclusion 
of such a requirement on the basis 
that it would impair insurers’ ability to 
investigate claims thoroughly before 
taking a decision on liability and make 
it almost impossible to calculate future 
liabilities.
The Bill
Clause 13A makes it an implied term 
of every contract of insurance that, 
following a claim, the insurer must pay 
sums due under an insurance policy 
‘within a reasonable time’. Failure by 
the insurer to do so will entitle the 
insured to pursue the remedies available 
under contract law, including damages, 
and those remedies shall be separate to 
the insured’s existing rights to recover 
the sums due under the policy together 
with interest on those sums.
It is a defence to a claim for breach of 
the implied term if an insurer can show 
that there were reasonable grounds 
for disputing a claim or its quantum. 
The insurer will not be held to have 
breached the implied term merely due to 
non-payment while a dispute is ongoing. 
However, a court may take into account 
the conduct of an insurer in handling 
the claim when deciding whether a 
breach has nonetheless occurred.
While contracting out of the remedies 
available for breach of the implied term 
is prohibited for consumer insurance 
contracts, it will be possible to contract 
out for non-consumer contracts, 
although any attempt to do so will be 
invalid if the insurer has committed 
a deliberate or reckless breach of the 
implied term. Any attempt to contract 
out is subject to compliance with the 
transparency requirements contained 
in the Act (see further below).
Likely areas of dispute
What is a ‘reasonable time’?
This was one of the key areas of 
concern for stakeholders during 
the consultation process, given the 
difficulty of specifying a single standard 
for a ‘reasonable time’ within which 
to pay a claim. Clause 13A simply 
provides that it includes ‘reasonable 
time to investigate and assess a claim’, 
and states that what is ‘reasonable’ 
will depend on all the relevant 
circumstances, including the following:
• the type of insurance involved
• the size and complexity of the claim
• compliance with any relevant 
statutory or regulatory rules  
or guidance
• factors outside the insurer’s control.
The explanatory notes to the Bill 
explain that some types of insurance, 
such as business interruption, are likely 
to take longer to assess than simple 
claims for property damage. Factors 
beyond the insurer’s control might 
include delays to an investigation due 
to the failure of a third party to supply 
relevant information or where a market 
follower in a subscription market is 
dependent upon a decision or action of 
the lead insurer.
It is inevitable that the scope of this 
wording, if incorporated into the Act 
in its current form, will be the subject 
of dispute. Its interpretation will 
also be of fundamental importance 
for determining when the breach of 
contract occurs, for the purposes of 
limitation of actions. The courts, aided 
by expert evidence, are likely to expand 
on the above factors and add additional 
ones, and for a market as diverse as 
the insurance industry, a range of 
standards is likely to emerge.
The insurer’s defence
Establishing coverage under an 
insurance policy often turns on subtle 
arguments relating to the interpretation 
of policy wordings and/or the results 
of a careful investigation into the 
circumstances of a loss. It therefore 
seems reasonable that an insurer 
should be afforded an appropriate 
amount of time to be able properly 
to investigate the claim (including its 
quantum) and that it should not be 
penalised for withholding payment 
until the claim is determined or agreed 
to be valid and its amount established.
Again, the courts will have to determine 
what should constitute reasonable 
grounds for disputing a claim, as well 
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as the types of conduct by the insurer 
and any other factors which could 
negate the defence.
Has an insurer successfully 
contracted out?
Another area of uncertainty, and 
therefore one which is likely to end 
up being the subject of dispute, is 
whether the parties to an insurance 
contract have effectively contracted 
out of the remedies available under 
clause 13A. Pursuant to clause 16A 
(also introduced by the Bill) and clause 
17 of the Act, an insurer attempting to 
include a term in a policy which puts 
an insured in a worse position than 
the default position set out in clause 
13A must comply with the following 
transparency requirements:
• It must take sufficient steps to 
draw the disadvantageous term to 
the insured’s attention before the 
contract is entered into.
• The term must be clear and 
unambiguous as to its effect.
A court must take into account the 
characteristics of the type of insured 
involved, and the circumstances of the 
transaction in determining whether 
these requirements have been met. 
For example, in the case of a small 
business purchasing insurance, the 
insurer might be expected to be more 
proactive and take more steps to bring 
the term in question to the insured’s 
attention than it would have to if 
the insured is a large business and a 
sophisticated buyer of insurance.
The drafting of any term in an 
insurance policy purporting to contract 
out of the remedies in clause 13A 
will no doubt be carefully scrutinised 
in the event of a dispute. Further, 
while a policy may contain a term 
which purports to allow the insurer to 
contract out, if that insurer deliberately 
or recklessly breaches clause 13A then 
its attempt to contract out will  
be ineffective.
Conclusion
Financial institutions will welcome 
the reform allowing damages for late 
payment of insurance claims. Complex 
insurance claims under a bank’s D&O 
liability, for instance, are susceptible 
to delay in payment while the insurer 
investigates and difficult arguments of 
construction of the policy are resolved. 
The old rule was becoming increasingly 
anomalous as the Financial 
Ombudsman Service will frequently 
compensate consumers for distress and 
inconvenience caused by late payment 
and Financial Conduct Authority 
rules (Insurance Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (ICOBS) 8.1.1.R) require 
insurers to handle claims promptly  
and fairly.
Any fundamental reform of a relatively 
settled area of law will throw up a 
number of issues and uncertainties. As 
discussed above, the introduction of 
an obligation on insurers to pay sums 
due under insurance policies within 
a reasonable time (within the context 
of the wider reforms introduced by 
the Act) is no different. These issues 
and uncertainties will have to be 
addressed over time by the courts, 
legal practitioners and the market, 
and while the precise mechanism of 
the obligation may yet change during 
its passage through the legislature, 
financial institutions should obviously 
monitor any consequential changes to 
the wordings of policies they purchase.
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A submission to English jurisdiction in the 2002 ISDA 
Master Agreement was not inconsistent with Danish 
insolvency proceedings that overrode the suspensory 
effect of s2(a)(iii) of the Agreement.
Facts
O.W. Supply & Trading (‘OWSupply’) 
and SwissMarine Corporation Ltd 
(‘SwissMarine’) entered into a 2002 
ISDA Master Agreement (the ‘ISDA 
Agreement’). OWSupply filed for 
bankruptcy in Denmark. SwissMarine 
did not designate an Early Termination 
Date. OWSupply brought proceedings 
in Denmark for close-out netting of 
the ISDA Agreement, on the basis that 
Danish insolvency law disapplied the 
suspensory provisions of s2(a)(iii) of 
the ISDA Agreement (under which no 
payments are made from the non-
defaulting party to the defaulting  
party following an event of default  
and before any Early Termination 
Date is designated – that is, the non-
defaulting party can effectively hold 
the contract ‘in suspense’, see Lomas v 
JRF Firth Rixson [2012] EWCA Civ 419 
for more details). SwissMarine sought 
an anti-suit injunction to restrain the 
Danish proceedings.
Decision
Andrew Smith J held that the 
proceedings in Denmark were not 
incompatible with the jurisdiction 
clause in the ISDA Agreement and 
refused to grant the anti-suit injunction.
The jurisdiction clause in section 
13 of the ISDA Agreement stated 
‘with respect to any suit, action or 
proceedings relating to any disputes 
arising out of or in connection with 
this Agreement (‘Proceedings’), each 
party irrevocably … submits … to (A) 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts if the Proceedings do 
not involve a Convention Court and (B) 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the English 
courts if the Proceedings do involve a 
Convention Court … ’
Andrew Smith J held that the 2002 
wording was similar in effect to the 
1992 wording, previously considered 
in AWB (Geneva) v North America SS 
Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 739. The Danish 
proceedings were not about what  
rights and obligations the parties  
have under the contract but how  
the Danish insolvency regime operates 
on those rights and obligations. 
Therefore, it was outside the scope  
of the jurisdiction clause.
Andrew Smith J also rejected the 
argument that ‘Convention Courts’ 
meant any court covered by the 
Brussels Regulation, so that the 
jurisdiction was in any case  
non-exclusive.
Discussion
As Denmark is not party to the 
Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EC) 
No 1346/2000), a discharge of the ISDA 
Agreement under the Danish insolvency 
regime will not be a discharge of the 
ISDA Agreement under English law. 
English courts will not recognise 
the modification of an English law 
governed contract by foreign courts. 
Accordingly, the Danish proceedings 
may lead to a judgment for a debt 
owing from SwissMarine to OWSupply 
under the ISDA Agreement and the 
English proceedings may lead to a 
judgment for a different sum under the 
ISDA Agreement, or a declaration that 
SwissMarine Corporation Ltd v  
O.W. Supply & Trading A/S  
[2015] EWHC 1571 (Comm)
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no sum is owing. Both incompatible 
judgments would theoretically be 
enforceable in other Member States, 
with unpredictable results.
There is some suggestion in the 
judgment that the Danish proceedings 
were embarked on specifically to 
circumvent the suspensory effect of 
s2(a)(iii). This then becomes another 
factor when considering whether 
to defer the designation of an Early 
Termination Date.
The analysis of the jurisdiction clause 
will also be of interest to derivatives 
practitioners. The curious split 
between exclusive and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction is due to an historic 
concern that non-exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses were not enforceable in  
certain jurisdictions.
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The High Court confirmed a Wednesbury 
unreasonableness test applies to whether a party  
has reasonably determined its Loss under a 1992  
ISDA Master Agreement.
Facts
The claimant, an Italian pension 
fund, claimed losses arising from the 
automatic early termination of a put 
option under a 1992 ISDA Master 
Agreement, triggered by the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. The claimant had invested in a 
structured product devised by Lehman 
– specifically in notes issued by ARIC, 
an SPV, the proceeds of which were 
indirectly invested in various hedge 
funds. The claimant also secured 
capital protection for the investment 
via the put option granted by Lehman.
Following the collapse of Lehman, the 
claimant sought to obtain substitute 
capital protection, which it eventually 
secured from Credit Suisse in May 
2009, albeit on terms which were 
different in a number of respects.
The Agreement provided that upon 
early automatic termination, the non-
defaulting party’s (i.e. ARIC’s) Loss 
would be payable – ‘Loss’ was defined 
as the ‘amount that party reasonably 
determines in good faith to be its 
total losses and costs’. Further, the 
Agreement provided that the party ‘will 
determine its Loss as of the relevant 
Early Termination Date or, if that is 
not reasonably practicable, as of the 
earliest date thereafter as is reasonably 
practicable. A party may (but need 
not) determine its Loss by reference to 
quotations of relevant rates or prices 
from one or more leading dealers in the 
relevant markets.’
ARIC calculated its Loss as a result of 
the early termination by reference to 
the cost of the replacement transaction 
obtained by the claimant, serving its 
calculation statement in September 
2009. It subsequently assigned the 
claim to the claimant.
The question for the court was as to 
the correct calculation of Loss as a 
result of the early termination. The 
claimant’s claim was calculated at in 
excess of $61 million, whereas Lehman 
contended that it was owed over  
$42 million.
Lehman argued that the claimant’s 
alleged loss had not been calculated 
in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement on various grounds 
including: that May 2009 was not 
the earliest reasonably practicable 
date at which loss could have been 
determined; the Credit Suisse option 
was wholly different to the original  
put option such that its price should 
not be used to ascertain the loss of 
bargain; the date of the calculation 
statement of September 16, 2009 was 
not ‘as soon as reasonably practicable 
following the occurrence of the ‘early 
termination date’.
Decision
David Richards J concluded that 
the claimant’s loss had been validly 
calculated in accordance with the terms 
of the ISDA Master Agreement and that 
accordingly, the claimant was entitled 
to judgment on its claim. Although the 
calculation statement ought to have 
been provided earlier than September 
2009, this did not affect the validity of 
the calculation of loss.
The Judge confirmed that in assessing 
whether a non-defaulting party has 
‘reasonably determined’ its loss, 
that party is not required to comply 
with an objective standard of care 
as in a negligence claim, but rather, 
‘must not arrive at a determination 
which no reasonable non-defaulting 
party could come to’. In other words, 
this is essentially a ‘Wednesbury 
unreasonableness’ test, which will be 
determined on the facts of the case.
In addition, he found that ARIC 
was entitled to calculate its loss by 
reference to the cost of the replacement 
put option granted to the claimant by 
Credit Suisse. Moreover, the Judge took 
the view that loss of bargain was better 
ascertained by references to quotations 
from the market than by financial 
Fondazione Enasarco v  
Lehman Brothers Finance SA  
[2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch)
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models, notwithstanding that the 
quotations were on different terms to 
the original transaction.
Finally, the Judge rejected the assertion 
that the quotation had not been 
obtained at the earliest ‘reasonably 
practicable’ date. David Richards J 
drew a distinction between ‘reasonably 
practicable’ and ‘possible’, and that 
to ascertain the former requires 
consideration of all the circumstances 
including those which are particular 
to the person who is required to 
act (although he doubted that the 
distinction would have made much 
difference in this case). Given the 
extensive effects of the collapse of 
Lehman, it had not been reasonably 
practicable for a replacement 
transaction to have been entered 
into prior to the end of 2008 – and 
even if it had been practical to obtain 
quotations prior to May 2009 it would 
have made no difference to the price of 
a replacement transaction.
Discussion
The decision is of interest in relation 
to the question of calculation of losses 
under a 1992 ISDA Master Agreement 
in a numbers of respects – in particular, 
the confirmation of a Wednesbury test 
to determine whether Loss has been 
reasonably determined.
Also of note is the Judge’s conclusion 
that where the parties contract on the 
basis that payment is measured by 
reference to the definition of ‘Market 
Quotation’ rather than ‘Loss’ (it was 
agreed that the two are intended to 
arrive at broadly the same result), the 
basis of calculation was not as Lehman 
contended. The ‘Market Quotations’ 
definition requires the replacement 
transaction to preserve the ‘economic 
equivalent of any payment or delivery’, 
not the ‘economic equivalent of 
the covenant under the terminated 
transaction to make payment or 
delivery’. In other words, the focus 
was on the payment to be made under 
the terminated transaction, not on 
the prospects of performance by the 
counter-party.
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A securitisation issuer was able to sue a valuer for 
negligent valuation of property forming part of the 
securitised assets.
Facts
A special purpose vehicle (SPV) issuer 
of notes in a commercial mortgage 
backed securitisation (CMBS) claimed 
that a property valuer gave a negligent 
valuation. The property was part of the 
portfolio of assets that were transferred 
to the SPV as part of the securitisation. 
The valuer claimed that the SPV had 
suffered no loss, because the claims of 
noteholders against it were reduced by 
the extent of any shortfall in the value 
of the property. Any loss had been 
suffered by the noteholders and it was 
they or the note trustee who should 
bring the action.
Decision
The Court of Appeal held that the 
valuation was not outside the margin of 
error of 15 per cent so that the claim of 
negligence did not succeed.
Although it was thus not strictly 
relevant, the Court of Appeal went on 
to consider the question of who was the 
correct claimant, as it was important 
to the securitisation industry and 
had been fully argued. The court held 
that the SPV was legal and beneficial 
owner of the property, even if it had 
transferred the commercial risk in 
the property, and so it had the title 
to sue. It was not relevant that any 
recovery might be passed straight on 
to noteholders in accordance with the 
securitisation documentation.
The court also accepted the argument 
that the entry of the SPV into the 
securitisation did not reduce the 
damage caused by the negligent 
valuation. It was an act that occurred 
after the loss had been suffered and it 
was not a consequence of the negligent 
valuation. Therefore, it was not to be 
taken into account in determining the 
SPV’s loss.
The case was analogous to a company 
and its shareholders – just because 
shareholders might be the ultimate 
losers, this did not deprive a company of 
the right to sue in respect of its property.
Discussion
The Court of Appeal took an admirably 
straightforward approach to the 
situation: a negligent valuation caused 
loss to the SPV when it acquired property 
that was worth less than expected. 
What happened afterwards – including 
an alienation of the risk in the property 
by the SPV – was not relevant.
This locates the title to sue in respect 
of securitised assets with the SPV. 
This is usually the right place. What 
this judgment sacrifices, in order 
to preserve simplicity, is the option 
to modify this conclusion if the 
securitisation documents require 
it. It follows that those drafting 
securitisation transactions should 
take account of receivables that accrue 
to the SPV as a result of litigation in 
respect of its assets.
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Titan Europe 2006-3 plc v  
Colliers International UK plc  
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